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CASE COMMENT
Between Pretext Only and Pretext Plus:
Understanding St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
and its Application to Summary Judgment
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1993, the Supreme Court revisited an area of civil
rights litigation it had defined twenty years earlier in the landmark
case of McDonnell Douglas v. Green.' McDonnell Douglas established
a well-known burden-shifting procedure designed to assist those
Title VII plaintiffs who do not have direct evidence of their
employers' discriminatory intentions. Originally established in the
context of racial discrimination,2 the reasoning of McDonnell Doug-
las and its burden-shifting framework have been extended into
several other areas of federal anti-discrimination law, including
age,' pregnancy,4 and handicap discrimination.' In each of these
areas, the McDonnell Douglas framework provides courts and liti-
gants with an ordered method of determining a crucial, yet often
elusive, element of the plaintiff's case: the employer's discriminato-
ry intent.
The Supreme Court's opinion in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks' does not represent its first return to McDonnell Douglas or
its first attempt to clarify circuit-splitting differences over the
decision's interpretation and application.' The Hicks opinion,
1 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2 Percy Green, the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas, was a black employee who
claimed that his dismissal was racially motivated. MDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
3 Age discrimination claims arise under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
4 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Tite VII to prohibit discrimi-
nation 'because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
5 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1990), prohibits
job discrimination against persons with disabilities.
6 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
7 See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
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which divided the Court 5-4 and produced a contentious exchange
between Justices Scalia and Souter, once again examined an area
of confusion produced by McDonnell Douglas and its progeny: what
precisely must a Title VII plaintiff show in order to carry her bur-
den of proof?
Most of the immediate reaction to Hicks agreed that the
Court's decision made the Title VII plaintiff's burden more diffi-
cult to bear;' some commentators and civil rights lawyers went
even further, claiming that the decision prevented recovery for all
plaintiffs except those with direct evidence of discrimination.9
Following the Hicks decision, Congress responded by introducing
legislation designed to undo its effect," and the EEOC has filed
numerous amicus briefs in cases which test its holding."
Although recent reaction to the case's effect has tempered
somewhat,12 fundamental questions regarding the interpretation
8 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Increase Workers' Burden in Job-Bias Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1993, at Al; David G. Savage, Justices Rule Fired Workers Must Prove Bias, Los AN-
GELES TIMES, June 26, 1993, at Al.
9 See Leading Cases: Federal Statutes and Regulations, 107 HARV. L. REV. 322, 343
(1993) (Hicks "effectively den[ies] remedy to many plaintiffs not fortunate enough to
'catch their bosses in the act.'"); Joan Biskupic, High Court Erects New Barrier to Job Bias
Suits; Employees Required to Furnish Direct Evidence of Discrimination, Which Can be Hard to Do,
THE WASH. PoST, June 26, 1993, at A4; William H. Freivogel, High Court Narrows Bias
Test: St. Louis Case Changes 20-Year-Old Precedent ST. Louis PoT-DISPATCH, June 26, 1993,
at 1A ("Civil rights lawyers . . . said the decision sharply cut back on the legal protection
available for two decades . . . ."); Supreme Court Ruling Makes Job Bias Difficult to Prove
(Nat'l Public Radio, "All Things Considered," June 25, 1993) ("Civil rights lawyers said
today's ruling would severely curtail their ability to win individual discrimination cases.
They contended that ... employees will be able to win their cases only in the rare case
where there is a smoking gun . . ").
10 On November 22, 1993, Senate Labor Subcommittee Chairman Howard
Metzenbaum and Representative Major Owens, Chairman of the Education and Labor
Select Education and Civil Rights Subcommittee, introduced companion legislation that
would "restore the legal framework federal courts ... used ... before the Supreme
Court's June 1993 decision." Congress Moves to Overturn Hicks Ruling, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 235 at d19 (Dec. 9, 1993). Congress was encouraged to do this by the
EEOC. EEOC Urges Congress to Overturn Supreme Court's 1993 Hicks Decision, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 193 at d7 (Oct. 7, 1993) (EEOC Chairman Tony Gallegos writing that "the
decision will have a negative effect on its enforcement efforts and therefore should be
overridden . . ").
11 Hicks Effects on Litigation are Narrow, D.C. Bar Association Panelists Contend, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 35 at d22 (Feb. 23, 1994) (Susan Buckingham Reilly, director of
the Washington, D.C., EEOC Field Office, stating that the EEOC does not like the Hicks
decision).
12 Id. (management and plaintiff's attorneys calling the Hicks decision "middle
ground" and agreeing that it will have a "narrow effect" on employment discrimination
litigation). See also Victoria A. Cundiff & Ann E. Chaitovitz, St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks: Lots of Sound and Fury, but What Does it Signify?, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 47
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of Hicks have arisen. While it may be generally agreed that the
plaintiff's burden at trial is now heavier in many circuits than
before, there remains some uncertainty concerning just how much
more difficult a burden the plaintiff must carry. And when applied
to motions for summary judgment, Hicks has produced two con-
tending standards within the lower federal courts. Fueled in part
by internally contradictory language," Hicks has left this impor-
tant issue unresolved.
This Comment will examine two areas of confusion that have
arisen in the months following the Hicks decision: the scope of its
holding and its application to motions for summary judgment.
Part II briefly reviews the prior decisions which gave rise to the
precise issue that Hicks addressed; Part III examines the decision
itself, focusing on its possible interpretations. Part IV surveys the
various judicial interpretations of the decision and the contrary
results produced, then advocates a reading of Hicks which is most
consistent with prior precedent. Finally, Part V considers the appli-
cation of Hicks to motions for summary judgment and advocates a
standard for deciding such motions which correctly reflects the
holding of the decision.
II. A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF DISPARATE TREATMENT: FROM
McDoNNELL DOuGLAS TO HICKS
A. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment claims arise when an individual is sub-
jected to intentionally discriminatory treatment based upon his or
her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Often, though,
the disparate treatment claimant does not have direct evidence
that his adverse employment treatment was the result of an imper-
missible motive. 4 Rather, he must rely upon indirect or circum-
stantial evidence to prove discrimination." Disparate treatment
(1993).
13 See Ellis v. NCNB National Bank, No. 3:91-CV-087-X, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 681,
at *19 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1994) ("This Court concedes that the portions of language
that tend to compete with one another in the St. Mary's decision are not immediately
reconcilable.").
14 An example of direct evidence of discrimination would be a comment by the
employer such as, "You're fired because you are black." With direct evidence, the only
issue that the factfinder must decide is whether or not it believes the witness presenting
the evidence. If so, then discrimination is directly proven.
15 For example, indirect (or circumstantial) evidence would be used when two equal-
ly qualified applicants, one black and one white, interviewed for the same position, and
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claims which rely on circumstantial evidence for proof of the
employer's discriminatory motive are often difficult to prove. For
these claims, the Supreme Court established a framework designed
to "bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly" to
the "ultimate question" of intentional discrimination. 6
B. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
The McDonnell Douglas framework consists of three stages. At
the first stage, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that
the employer discriminated against her. Second, the employer pro-
duces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. Finally, the plaintiff attempts to discredit the employer by
proving that the employer's reason was a pretext for discrimina-
tion. In order to understand the issue that prompted the Hicks
decision, it is first necessary to examine this framework and the
reasoning behind it.
1. Stage 1: Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
Under the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework, the plain-
tiff has the initial burden of establishing, through a preponder-
ance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. This is
usually accomplished by showing that: (i) the plaintiff is a member
of a class protected by Title VII; (ii) the plaintiff applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) the plaintiff was rejected, despite his or her qualifications;
and (iv) after his or her rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons with
the plaintiff's qualifications." As the Court recognized, however,
these four elements of the prima facie case may or may not apply
to any given plaintiff, depending upon the facts of the case."8
the white employee was hired. Because the black plaintiff has no direct evidence of
racial discrimination, he must rely upon an inference of discrimination. In this situation,
the factfinder must determine two issues: first, whether it finds tife plaintiff's evidence
credible, and second whether the conclusion of discrimination can reasonably be drawn
from the evidence. Indirect evidence involves an inferential step not necessary with direct
evidence.
16 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
17 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
18 Id. at 802 n.13. For example, the fourth element of the prima facie case would
not be necessary in a situation where the plaintiff is fired and his former position is
eliminated entirely.
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Although the burden of establishing a prima facie case is, by
the Court's own admission, "not onerous,"" this requirement
serves an important purpose: it "eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection."" After the
most common reasons for the adverse employment action have
been eliminated, the prima facie case gives rise to a rebuttable
presumption that the real reason was discrimination.21 As the
Court explained in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,22 this pre-
sumption arises out of common-sense observations about the na-
ture of employment relationships in general:
[W] e are willing to presume this largely because we know from
our experience that more often than not people do not act in
a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons,
especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate rea-
sons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible
reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not
the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration
such as race.s
After the plaintiffs prima facie case, the focus then turns to
the employer's justification for its action.
2. Stage 2: Defendant's Response
In the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
employer has the responsibility of explaining its action toward the
plaintiff. Since the prima facie case creates a presumption of dis-
crimination, if the employer fails to respond to the prima facie
case and if the trier of fact believes the plaintiffs prima facie
evidence, then the plaintiff will receive judgment as a matter of
law. It is crucial to note, however, that only the burden of pro-
duction shifts to the employer; at no time does the defendant need
to persuade the trier of fact that "it was actually motivated by the
19 Burdin, 450 U.S. at 253.
20 Id. at 253-54.
21 Id. at 254. In Burdine the Court also noted that the phrase "prima facie case" can
be used in two ways: it may "denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable
presumption," or it may "describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to
permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue." Id. at 254 n.7. The Burdine Court em-
phasized that "in the Title VII context we use 'prima facie case' in the former sense." Id.
22 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
23 Id. at 577.
24 Id. at 254.
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proffered reasons."" Rather, the employer must simply articulate
a reason for his or her action through the introduction of admissi-
ble evidence. 6 The burden of persuasion remains at all times
with the plaintiff, who must prove to the trier of fact "that the de-
fendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff ... .""
Because the employer does not need to persuade the
factfinder that the reason it offers is the true reason, it is possible
for the employer to offer a false reason for its action and yet still
rebut the mandatory presumption which arises out of the
plaintiff's prima facie case. Although the Court recognized in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine that this was possi-
ble, it overruled an attempt by the Fifth Circuit to shift to the
employer a heavier burden. In Burdine, the Fifth Circuit required
the employer to persuade the court "that it had convincing, objec-
tive reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above the plain-
tiff."2" The unanimous Burdine Court rejected this attempt and
concluded that even though the employer could satisfy the burden
of production by articulating a fictitious reason for its action, this
would not hinder the plaintiff's attempt to prove discrimina-
tion.'
Even though the employer need only produce an explanation
for its behavior, the reason given must still meet a variety of stan-
dards. McDonfiell Douglas held that the reason must be "legitimate"
and "nondiscriminatory.""0 In Burdine, the Court wrote that the
explanation must be "legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
25 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
26 Id. at 256. An employer cannot rely solely upon an answer to the complaint or
upon the argument of counsel. Id. at 256 n.9.
27 Id. at 253.
28 Id. at 257.
29 The Burdine court offered three reasons for this conclusion:
First, . . . the defendant's explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear
and reasonably specific . . . . Second, although the defendant does not bear a
formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an incentive to
persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful . . . . Third,
the liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in federal court are supple-
mented in a Title VII suit by the plaintiffs access to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint. Given
these factors, we are unpersuaded that the plaintiff will find it particularly diffi-
cult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext.
Id. at 258 (citations omitted). The precise nature of the employer's burden was also at is-
sue in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, and Justice Scalia's opinion is discussed infra
notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
30 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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defendant" if it were believed by the trier of fact."1 According to
Burdine, the reason must also be "clear" and "reasonably specif-
ic." 2 If the defendant's proffered explanation meets these stan-
dards, then it rebuts the presumption of discrimination.
The employer's rebuttal serves two purposes: first, it serves as
a response to the prima facie case and moves the trial forward.
Second, the employer's explanation frames the factual issues which
remain disputed, and thereby defines the plaintiff's remaining
task-proving that the employer's reason is a "pretext." '
3. Stage 3: Plaintiff's Proof of Pretext
The third phase of the McDonnell Douglas framework shifts the
burden of production back to the plaintiff, who must persuade the
trier of fact that the employer's articulated reason is a "pretext."'
If the plaintiff succeeds in disproving the reason stated by the em-
ployer, then the controversy that prompted St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks arises: Is it enough that the plaintiff merely disprove the
employer's proffered reason? Or must the plaintiff shoulder the
additional burden of proving that the real reason was discrimina-
tion? Courts adhering to the former standard adopted what has
been dubbed the "pretext only" position, and those adhering to
the latter accepted the "pretext plus" position.
31 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
32 Id. at 258.
33 See id. at 255-56.
34 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. In other words, the plaintiff must have the
opportunity to "demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment - decision." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Burdine distinguished two different bur-
dens the plaintiff must meet: the "intermediate evidentiary burdens" of the McDonnell
Douglas framework and the "ultimate burden" of proving discrimination. At this stage, the
plaintiff's evidentiary burden "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The
Court suggested that the plaintiff could prove pretext through the use of comparative
evidence (i.e. showing that another employee similarly situated was treated differently),
through statistical evidence, or anecdotal evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
35 For a comprehensive explanation and analysis of the state of this controversy
before it was addressed by Hicks, see generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies
and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1991).
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C. Pretext Only and Pretext Plus
1. Distinguished
The differences between the pretext only and pretext plus
positions are significant: before Hicks, a plaintiff in a pretext only
circuit was entitled to judgment as a matter of law if he could
prove that the employer's reason was not believable. The defen-
dant in such a jurisdiction would be found to have violated Title
VII if his reason was not believed by the trier of fact.
But in a pretext plus jurisdiction, the plaintiff cannot prevail
merely by disproving the employer's reason. The plaintiff must
establish that the real reason for the employer's action was dis-
crimination. As noted by one commentator, often the plaintiff
cannot accomplish this task without "produc[ing] some additional
evidence other than the evidence supporting the prima facie case
and other than the fact of the defendant's deception.""6 Accord-
ing to this position, the plaintiffs proof of pretext does not
amount to proof of intentional discrimination; all that is shown by
disproof of the employer's proffered reason is that the employer
misrepresented the true reasons for the action, not that the em-
ployer violated Title VII. As a result of this higher standard of
proof, a plaintiff who would have received judgment as a matter
of law in a pretext only jurisdiction would lose for failing to meet
his burden of proof in a pretext plus jurisdiction.
2. Support for the Pretext Only Position
Prior to Hicks, the pretext only position had been adopted by
the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits."7 The reasoning
of these jurisdictions is rooted in the common-sense observations
mentioned in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters- that employers
usually do not act arbitrarily, and that once all the legitimate rea-
sons for an employment decision are eliminated (including the
legitimate reason offered by the employer), the real reason was
probably discriminatory.' Based on these assumptions about the
workplace and human decision-making, a reasonable inference of
discrimination arises when the employer is shown to have misrep-
36 Id. at 88.
37 Id. at 71-75.
38 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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resented the true motive for its action. This inferential step con-
nects the finding of pretext with the finding of discrimination.
Proof of pretext combined with the elements of the prima facie
case, therefore, meet the plaintiff's burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence-more likely than not-that discrimi-
nation motivated the employer's action.
This position also finds support in the language of Burdine.
The Court held in Burdine that the plaintiff retains the burden of
persuasion at all times and added that the opportunity to prove
pretext "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination." 9 This
merged burden, however, may be carried in one of two ways: the
plaintiff may prove discrimination "either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-
ployer or indirectly by showing that the employers's proffered expla-
nation is unworthy of credence."' This passage from Burdine
clearly equated proof of pretext with proof of discrimination.41
Finally, pretext only jurisdictions argue that this third stage of
the McDonnell Douglas framework serves the important purpose of
narrowing the disputed issues. Once the employer articulates a
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff's response is
narrowed to attacking that reason alone. The plaintiff need not
fear that other unmentioned motives will later be used to justify
the employer's action-motives that the plaintiff was not given a
"full and fair opportunity" to demonstrate were pretextual.'
3. Support for the Pretext Plus Position
Before St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, a minority of circuits*
had adopted a pretext plus position, including the First, Fourth,
and Eleventh Circuits.4' Supporters of this position argue that
Title VII does not outlaw poor business judgment, arbitrary behav-
ior, or discrimination based on characteristics other than race,
39 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
40 Id. at 256.
41 Although the pretext only position was rejected by the Hicks Court, this passage
provided difficulty to Justice Scalia. He acknowledged that "[t]he words bear no other
meaning but that the falsity of the employer's explanation is alone enough to compel
judgment for the plaintiff." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752
(1993). He went on to argue, however, that such an interpretation of this "dictum" con-
tradicted the rest of the opinion. Id.
42 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
43 Lanctot, supra note 38, at 82-85.
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national origin, religion, sex, or color; employers who act upon
such a motivation and then conceal their real reasons do not
violate the purposes of Title VII. Merely demonstrating pretext is
not tantamount to proving discrimination, and the employer
should not be held liable for violating Title VII. The plaintiff,
therefore, cannot prevail unless he proves both that the employer's
proffered reason was false and that the real reason was discrimina-
tory. More often than not, this requires that the plaintiff introduce
additional evidence, on top of the evidence proving the prima
facie case and pretext."
As a result of the controversy that arose out of the competing
pretext only and pretext plus standards, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case of Melvin Hicks, a black security officer in
Missouri. In resolving Mr. Hicks's lawsuit, the Court clearly reject-
ed the pretext only position. The position that the Court adopted
in its stead, however, is less clear.
III. ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS
A. The Factual Background
Melvin Hicks, a black employee of St. Mary's Honor Center,
was discharged from his position after six years of employment.
45
Hicks began working at St. Mary's in 1978 as a correctional offi-
cer, and he was promoted to shift commander in 1980. For six
years his work record was satisfactory.46 But in January 1984, the
organizational structure of the facility was changed dramatically,
and Hicks came under new supervision.
Following this change in personnel, Hicks was subject to fre-
quent discipline for procedural infractions.' Hicks was the only
employee disciplined for the incidents which occurred during his
shift,' and more serious infractions by other shift commanders,
44 Id. at 88.
45 St. Mary's Honor Center is a minimum security correctional facility operated by
the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources. Hicks v. St. Mary's Hon-
or Center, 756 F. Supp 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
46 Id. at 1246.
47 In March of 1984, during the plaintiff's shift, the front door was improperly
guarded and the first floor lights were off. The plaintiff was the only employee disci-
plined for the incident, and he received a five-day suspension. Later that month, the
plaintiff was demoted for failing to insure that the use of a St. Mary's vehicle by another
employee was properly recorded. Again, the other employees involved were not disci-
plined. Id. at 1246-47.
48 The chief of custody testified that it was his policy to discipline only the shift
commander for violations which occur during his shift, not the other employees involved.
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all of whom were white, went unpunished.49 Finally, in June 1984,
Hicks was terminated after a heated confrontation with his supervi-
sorl-a confrontation later determined by the district court to
have been "manufactured" in order to provoke Hicks.51
Hicks alleged that his termination and prior demotion were
racially motivated and thereby violated Title VII. He established a
prima facie case of racial discrimination and challenged his
employer's asserted reasons for its action as false. The issue gener-
ated by these facts and presented to Judge Limbaugh of the East-
ern District of Missouri focused on the sufficiency of the evidence
and whether Hicks had carried his burden of proof.
B. The District Court Opinion
District Judge Limbaugh determined that Hicks had estab-
lished his prima facie case of discrimination and that the employ-
er had rebutted the presumption of discrimination by producing
two nondiscriminatory reasons for Hicks's dismissal: the severity
and the accumulation of violations committed by the plaintiff.52
The district court 3 found that Hicks had proven his employer's
reasons were pretextual, based on the evidence that Hicks had
been singled out for harsh discipline when more serious infrac-
tions by others went unpunished.'M
Despite the finding that the proffered reasons for Hicks's
dismissal were not the real reasons, the district court granted judg-
ment for St. Mary's. Given that the number of black employees at
St. Mary's remained constant during the time of Hicks's firing and
that black reviewers sat on the board which disciplined Hicks, the
court held that Hicks failed to prove his ultimate burden of racial
discrimination.55 "It is clear," wrote the court, "that [Hicks's su-
pervisorl had placed plaintiff on the express track to termina-
tion .... It is not clear, however, that plaintiff's race was the
Id. at 1247.
49 For example, an acting shift commander (who was white) was negligent in carry-
ing out an order to transport an inmate to the city jail and the inmate escaped. The
employee received only a letter of reprimand. Id. at 1248.
ou Id. at J2,.
51 Id. at 1251.
52 Id. at 1250.
53 Given that this trial occurred before the implementation of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, a jury trial was unavailable and the case was tried to Judge iUmbaugh. Id. at 1245.
54 Id. at 1250-51.
55 Id. at 1252.
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motivation for the harsh discipline."56 Perhaps, opined the court,
the real reason behind the supervisor's actions was personal dis-
like, apart from racial considerations.57
Through this reasoning, the district court aligned itself with
the pretext plus position, demanding more from Hicks than a
prima facie case and a showing of pretext. In order to win his
case, Hicks had to prove "by direct evidence or inference that his
unfair treatment was motivated by his race. " '
C. The Eighth Circuit Opinion
The Eighth Circuit overruled the district court and aligned
itself with the pretext only position.' It held that the lower court
was incorrect in two of its conclusions. First, having no evidence
to support the assumption, the district court wrongly assumed a
personal (rather than racial) motivation for the supervisor's ac-
tions.' The supervisor had not claimed that personal animosity
motivated his actions, and the plaintiff never had an opportunity
to refute the proposition."
Second, the district court erroneously required that the plain-
tiff prove something more than a prima facie case and pretext;
upon proof of the prima facie case and pretext, Hicks deserved
judgment as a matter of law.62 The appellate court reasoned that
after Hicks discredited his employer's proffered nondiscriminatory
reasons for the demotions and termination, St. Mary's was in no
better position than if it had remained silent; the pretextual rea-
sons for its actions could not rebut the presumption of racial dis-
crimination Hicks raised through his prima facie case. Therefore,
the presumption stood and compelled a judgment for the plain-
tiff. Proving a prima facie case and pretext alone "satisfied [the
plaintiff's] ultimate burden of persuasion. No additional proof of
discrimination [was] required."' Under this reasoning, a prima
facie case combined with proof of pretext equaled proof of dis-
criminatory intent.
56 Id. at 1251 (emphasis added).
57 Id. at 1252.
58 Id.
59 Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992).




64 Id. at 493.
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D. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
Five Supreme Court justices disagreed with the Eighth Circuit
and rejected the reasoning of the pretext only position. Writing
for the majority,' Justice Scalia analyzed the McDonnell Douglas
line of cases quite differently than the pretext only courts had.
Justice Scalia's primary argument focused on the interplay
between the burden of production and the burden of proof as
governed by Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' The
presumption enjoyed by the plaintiff in a disparate treatment case,
wrote Scalia, operates like all presumptions in that it simply shifts
the burden of production to the other party, as described in Rule
301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." The purpose of this pre-
sumption is to "forc[e] the defendant to come forward with some
response."' He reiterated that even though the burden of pro-
duction shifted to the defendant at the second stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, "' [tihe ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."'69
Saddled with the burden of production, the defendant may
rebut the presumption of discrimination by "'clearly set[ting]
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,' reasons
for its actions which; if believed by the trier of fact, would support a
finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the em-
ployment action."70 Essential to Justice Scalia's reasoning is that
this rebuttal is effective by .the mere production of the evi-
65 Justice Scalia was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Jus-
tice Rhenquist. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2745 (1993).
66 Rule 3Ol'provides that:
[i]n all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the pre-
sumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EvID. 301.
67 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
68 Id. at 2749.
69 Id. at 2747 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981)).
70 Id. (quoting Burdine 450 U.S. at 255).
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dence-its persuasive effect is irrelevant, as the defendant at no
time bears the "risk of nonpersuasion."'
Justice Scalia then addressed the Eighth Circuit's argument
that if a defendant misrepresents the real reasons for the employ-
ment action, the misrepresentation cannot effectively rebut the
presumption and give the defendant an advantage he would not
have enjoyed by remaining silent.72 In response, Justice Scalia
pointed out that such a result is not uncommon and that proce-
dural rules often benefit the dishonest litigant."v
One passage in Burdine, however, proved problematic to the
majority's position. According to Burdine, the employee may "suc-
ceed in [proving his ultimate burden] either directly by persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence."74 Justice Scalia agreed with
Justice Souter's dissent that this language "bear[s] no other mean-
ing but that the falsity of the employer's explanation is alone
enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff."'75 Such a conclusion
based upon this "dictum," however, would contradict the holdings
of McDonnell Douglas and of Burdine itself.8 The passage, he
maintained, could only be explained as an "inadvertence. " "
71 FED. R. EVID. 301. See Hicks, 113 S. CL at 2748 ("By producing evidence (whether
ultimately persuasive or not) of nondiscriminatory reasons, petitioners sustained their
burden of production . . ").
72 The Eighth Circuit held:
Because all of defendants' proffered reasons were discredited, defendants were in
a position of having offered no legitimate reason for their actions. In other
words, defendants were in no better position than if they had remained silent,
offering no rebuttal to an established inference that they had unlawfully discrimi-
nated against plaintiff on the basis of his race.
Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992).
73 For example,
[a] defendant who fails to answer a complaint will, on motion, suffer a default
judgment that a deceitful response could have avoided. A defendant whose an-
swer fails to contest critical averments in the complaint will, on motion, suffer a
judgment on the pleadings that untruthful denials could have avoided. And a
defendant who fails to submit affidavits creating a genuine issue of fact in re-
sponse to a motion for summary judgment will suffer a dismissal that false affi-
davits could have avoided.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2755 (1993) (citations omitted).
74 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (emphasis
added).
75 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
76 Id. at 2752-53.
77 Id. at 2753.
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In essence, the majority rejected the Eighth Circuit's holding
that a finding of pretext compelled judgment for the plaintiff. "It
is not enough," wrote Justice Scalia, "to disbelieve the employer;
the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional
discrimination."78
2. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter, writing .for the minority,79 vehemently dis-
agreed with Justice Scalia's majority opinion. Calling the majority's
holding a "depart[ure] from settled precedent,"' Justice Souter's
dissent attacked the majority opinion on several fronts. First, the
decision unfairly "saddle[ldl the victims of discrimination with the
burden of either producing direct evidence of discriminatory in-
tent or eliminating the entire universe of possible nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for a personnel decision."8 If proof that the
employer's proffered reason is pretext does not compel judgment
for the plaintiff, then it is possible for the factfinder to determine
that a reason other than the one articulated by the employer was
the actual motivation.
An illustration of this argument is found in the district court's
opinion. In dismissing Hicks's claim, Judge Limbaugh wrote that
although Hicks had proven that his superiors wished to terminate
him, he had not sufficiently proven that the motivation arose out
of racial, rather than personal, animosity. 2 Personal animosity, as
mentioned above, had not been introduced by the defendants at
trial as a possible motivation for their behavior." In fact, one of
Hicks's supervisors testified that he did not have any personal diffi-
culties with Hicks. 4 At trial Hicks was unable to predict that this
would be considered a possible explanation for St. Mary's action
and, therefore, was unable to discredit the possibility. By rejecting
78 Id. at 2754 (rephrasing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
79 Justice Souter was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Hiks, 113 S.
Ct. at 2756.
80 Id. at 2757.
81 Id. at 2758.
82 Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
83 The two reasons offered by St. Mary's for Hicks's termination were "the severity
and the accumulation of violations committed by plaintiff." Id. at 1250.
84 James R. Neely, Jr., Deputy General Counsel of the EEOC, Preliminary Guidance
on the Impliciatons of the Supreme Court's Decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks 8 (Aug. 3, 1993) (unpublished memorandum, available through EEOC Office of
General Counsel).
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the pretext only position, argued Justice Souter, the majority opin-
ion denied Hicks and other plaintiffs in his position the opportu-
nity to aim their responses at a specific target: disproving the
employer's stated explanation for its action. Rather, they must
"disprove all other reasons suggested, no matter how vaguely, in
the record."'
Second, the dissent criticized the majority for failing to de-
scribe practically how a plaintiff possessing evidence only of the
prima facie case and pretext can meet the "ultimate burden" of
proving discrimination."5 Burdine, wrote Justice Souter, said that
this purpose may be accomplished "indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."" The
majority's rejection of this method was explicit, but it did not
clarify what the plaintiff must do instead.
Third, the majority opinion did not adequately explain why a
showing of pretext and the inference of discrimination that arises
out of it is insufficient. Once the plaintiff proves that the employ-
er is concealing its true reasons for the adverse employment ac-
tion, "'common experience' tells us that it is 'more likely than
not' that the employer who lies is simply trying to cover up the il-
legality alleged by the plaintiff,"' Additionally, the dissent argued
that employers who misrepresent the true motivations behind their
actions are thereby "exempt[ed] ... from responsibility for
lies."89
Fourth, the dissent argued that the purposes of Title VII were
frustrated by the majority's holding. By making it more difficult
for plaintiffs to anticipate which explanations might be relied
upon by the factfinder, the careful plaintiff must anticipate and
prepare for all "side issues" that might arise, making discovery
more tedious and trials longer. The increased costs and decreased
certainty of Title VII litigation would discourage plaintiffs like
Melvin Hicks from ,bringing suit.9"
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's reading of
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, especially United States Postal
85 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2762 (1993) (quoting the
majority's opinion at 2756).
86 Id. at 2761.
87 Id. at 2762 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).




COMMENT-ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS
Service Board v. Aikens.9' The greatest problem with the majority's
reliance upon Aikens, wrote Justice Souter, is that Aikens quoted
with approval the passage in Burdine that the majority's opinion
dismissed as an "inadvertence."92 Following this passage, the
Court in Aikens remanded the case and directed the district court
to choose "which party's explanation of the employer's motivation
it believes.""3 Contrary to the majority's interpretation, the dissent
wrote that this directive limits the lower court's options to one of
the two presented by the litigants and prohibits the court from
seeking out a third explanation hidden somewhere in the
record.4
IV. TWO ALTERNATIE INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE SCOPE OF Hicms
Although the majority clearly rejected the pretext only posi-
tion, it is questionable what standard of proof it adopted to fill
the vacancy. As highlighted by Justice Souter's dissent, the
majority's opinion can arguably be read to support two alternate
positions. Justice Souter notes that at one point the majority holds
that proof of a prima facie case and pretext may permit the
factfinder to infer discrimination. Yet at another point, the
majority's language supports a "more extreme conclusion"-that
proof of pretext, without more, will not be sufficient to sustain a
judgment for the plaintiff.95 Despite the majority's assertion that
there is nothing inconsistent between these two readings,96 subse-
quent interpretation of the Hicks decision reveals that it has sent
"conflicting signals." 97
91 460 U.S. 711 (]983).
92 Hicks, 113 S. CL at 2765; see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
93 United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1982).
94 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2765.
95 Id. at 2762.
96 In response to Justice Souter's conclusion that the majority's opinion sends "con-
flicting signals," id., the majority claims that:
there is nothing whatever inconsistent between [our statement that pretext may
sustain a finding of discrimination] and our later statement[] that ... the
plaintiff must show "both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was
the real reason . . . ." Even though (as we say here) rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimina-
tion, there must be a finding of discrimination.
Id. at 2749 n.4 (citations omitted).
97 Id. at 2762.
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A. Support for a Pretext Plus Interpretation
One possible interpretation of Hicks is that it is an affirmation
of the pretext plus position discussed above; in other words, a
showing of pretext, without more, is never sufficient to sustain the
plaintiffs burden of proof unless combined with some additional
evidence of discriminatory intent. 8 Textual support for this read-
ing is found in the language of Hicks that appears to require a
dual evidentiary showing from the plaintiff. For example, Justice
Scalia wrote that "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for
discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and
that discrimination was the real reason."" He also stated that
"nothing in law would permit us to substitute for the required
finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful
discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that
the employer's explanation of its action was not believable.""°
This interpretation also finds support in portions of the opin-
ion that denigrate the probative value of the prima facie case, sug-
gesting that a prima facie showing is merely a procedural ordering
of the production of evidence. For example, Justice Scalia wrote
that once the employer rebuts the presumption of discrimination,
"the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions and
98 For example, in Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 1993), the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's early retirement program was implemented in a
manner that discriminated on the basis of age. In examining the plaintiff's burden of
proof under the McDonnell Douglas framework, as modified by Hicks, the court wrote:
To prevail at this third stage, the plaintiff must ordinarily do more than impugn
the legitimacy of the employer's asserted justification; he must also adduce evi-
dence "of the employer's discriminatory animus." [S]ee also Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706, 1708 (1993) (stating that liability under the
ADEA depends upon whether age "actually motivated the employer's decisiQn"
and hesitating to infer age-based animus solely "from the implausibility of the
employer's explanation") ....
Id. at 479 (citation omitted). The First Circuit appeared to prefer a pretext plus position,
given its hesitancy to infer discrimination from a showing of pretext without additional
evidence. But this issue was not reached as the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie
case. Id. at 480.
99 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993). See also id. at
2747 ("The plaintiff then has 'the full and fair opportunity to demonstrate,' . . . 'that
the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision' and that race
was.") (citation omitted) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 256 (1981); Id. at 2749 n.4 ("Even though . . . rejection of the defendant's prof-
fered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination, there must be a find-
ing of discrimination.").
100 Id. at 2751.
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burdens-is no longer relevant."1 ' Therefore, after the initial
profferings of evidence, the only remaining issue for the court is
whether the plaintiff proved discrimination by a preponderance of
the evidence. The majority also stated that after the second stage
of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the inquiry then moves from
"the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to the
specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation . . .
,102 These comments indicate that the prima facie case and
proof of pretext do not have much value in and of themselves,
but only serve as procedural steps along the way to establishing
the ultimate issue of discrimination.
B. Support for a "Permissive Inference" Interpretation
1. Textual Argument
An alternate interpretation of Hicks contends that the holding
of the opinion is much narrower in scope. Rather than establish-
ing an additional burden of proof for the plaintiff, the opinion
merely reverses the Eight Circuit's holding that a prima facie case
plus a showing of pretext compels judgment for the plaintiff as a
matter of law. According to this interpretation, proof of the prima
facie case and pretext permits the factfinder to infer discrimination,
although it does not mandate such a judgment. Courts which
interpret the opinion in this manner rely upon the following lan-
guage:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspi-
cion of mendacity) may, togethei with the elements of the
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.
Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional dis-
crimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it
noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o additional proof of
discrimination is required. . .103
If this is the proper interpretation of Hicks, then the opinion
adopted a third position which falls between the requirements of
pretext only and pretext plus: that although not entitled to judg-
101 Id. at 2749. See also id. at 2755 ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas presumption is a proce-
dural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and production.").
102 Id. at 2752.
103 Id. at 2749 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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ment as a matter of law upon proof of a prima facie case and
pretext, a plaintiff may prevail without having to introduce addi-
tional evidence of discrimination.
What the Hicks decision makes clear, however, is that even if
a court infers discrimination from the plaintiffs prima facie case
and pretext, it still must make a specific finding of intentional dis-
crimination in order for the plaintiff to carry its ultimate burden.
Justice Scalia emphasized this requirement in footnote four of his
opinion, where he wrote that "[e]ven though ... rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding
of discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination."'
The requirement of a specific finding of discrimination re-
flects two conclusions developed in Justice Scalia's opinion. First,
such a finding is mandated because the majority recognized a
distinction between proof of pretext and proof of intentional dis-
crimination. Because the majority did not equate "the required
finding that the employer's action Was the product of unlawful
discrimination" with "the much different (and much lesser) find-
ing that the employer's explanation of its action was not believ-
able,""0 5 the factfinder must specifically state that it draws from
the evidence of pretext an inference of discrimination, thereby
connecting what the majority declined to equate.
Second, as Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence makes
clear, the plaintiff at all times retains the ultimate burden of prov-
ing intentional discrimination.' Requiring the district court to
make the specific finding of intentional discrimination avoids con-
jecture as to whether or not the plaintiff carried this burden.
The Eleventh Circuit recently illustrated the importance of
this aspect of Hicks. In Meeks v. Computer Associates Internation-
a1'07 the court overturned a judgment for the plaintiff because
the district court had failed to make a specific finding of inten-
tional discrimination. The defendant, Computer Associates, had
been found liable under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) by a jury and
had been found liable for sex discrimination and retaliation by
the district court. The district court had considered itself bound
by the jury's special verdict on the EPA claim and concluded that
104 Id. at 2749 n.4.
105 Id. at 2751.
106 "[A] presumption . . . does not shift . . . the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom
it was originally cast." FED. R. EvID. 301.
107 No. 92-2926, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4073 (llth Cir. Mar. 7, 1994).
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the defendant violated Title VII as well by engaging in gender-
based wage discrimination. The defendant argued thata violation
of the EPA is not a per se violation of Title VII because "Title VII
requires proof of the additional element of discriminatory in-
tent."108
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with this argument and
overturned the district court's judgment of Title VII liability. The
court reasoned that the jury's special verdict merely determined
that the defendant had failed to prove that the salary differential
between the plaintiff and her coworkers was based on factors oth-
er than sex. The verdict did not establish that the salary differ-
ential was based on gender or that the discrimination was inten-
tional.1" Because neither the jury nor the district court found
that the defendant intentionally discriminated on the basis of
gender, the judgment was overturned. The court reinforced this
conclusion with the holding of Hicks.
Even if we were to accept Meeks' invitation to treat the jury's
finding as establishing that she had disproved Computer
Associates' proffered justifications, we would still have to reverse
Meeks' Title VII wage discrimination judgment. As Hicks makes
clear, the trier of fact must make a finding of intentional dis-
crimination .... The court may have believed that Meeks
proved intent, but it did not so find, and its findings are there-
fore insufficient under Hicks to support its Title VII wage dis-
crimination judgment"'
On remand, the district court was instructed to enter additional
findings of fact, including whether the court found intentional dis-
crimination.' Had the district court made a specific finding of
intentional discrimination, pursuant to Hicks, the judgment would
not have been overturned.
108 Id. at *16.
109 Id. at *22-23.
110 Id. at *23-*25 (citations omitted).
111 Id. at *25. See also Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., No. 92-1753, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 3541 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 1994) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
general jury instructions failed to require that the jury specifically find pretext and inten-
tional discrimination); Ellis v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, No. 3:91-CV-087-X, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 681, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1994) (articulating jury instructions which "anchor
a finding of pretext necessarily in a finding of unlawful discrimination."). But see
McNabola v. Chicago Transit, 10 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 1993) (interpreting a jury's general
verdict to stand for a finding of pretext and intentional discrimination).
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2. Structural Argument
Additional support for a permissive inference reading of Hicks
is found in the structure of the majority's opinion. The language
which seems to support a pretext plus position appears in Parts III
and IV of the Hicks opinion.1 2 These sections, however, were
written to support further the holding of the case and to respond
to the criticisms of the dissent."'
Part II of the opinion contains the holding of the case and
the reasoning behind it, beginning with a brief review of Title VII,
McDonnell Douglas, and Burdine. The Court then concludes that the
mere production of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the
defendant's action rebuts the McDonnell Douglas presumption un-
der Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the plain-
tiff always retains the ultimate burden of proving discrimination.
At this point, the Court makes clear that in order to carry this
burden, the plaintiff need not produce any additional evidence of
discrimination. It is enough that the plaintiff present his or her
prima facie case and evidence of pretext, and from this evidence
discrimination may be inferred. 4 Often, language used to sup-
port a contrary reading is not selected from the Court's holding
in Part II, but is mistakenly drawn from the Court's arguments in
response to the dissent.
3. Support from the Assumptions Underlying the McDonnell
Douglas Framework
Justice Scalia wrote that the Court's holding would upset only
those unfamiliar with the Court's case law."' A permissive infer-
ence interpretation of Hicks is consistent with the assumptions that
gave rise to the McDonnell Douglas framework in the first place. As
explained in Furnco, a finding of pretext points toward discrimina-
tion because of two common-sense observations: (1) employers
generally do not act arbitrarily, and (2) if an employer conceals
112 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
113 Part III declares itself to be a review of prior precedent and an attempt to show
congruence of Hicks with the past 20 years of holdings. Id. at 2750. Part IV addresses the
"dire practical consequences" that the dissent claims will arise from the decision. Id. at
2754.
114 Id. at 2749.
115 Id. at 2750.
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the real reason for the adverse employment action, the real reason
is most likely discrimination."1
A permissive inference reading of Hicks accurately reflects
these common-sense assumptions by permitting the trier of fact to
use them. Because of these two assumptions, the trier of fact may
infer discrimination when the employer's proffered explanations
for the adverse employment action have been discredited. A pre-
text plus understanding of Hicks, however, necessarily disregards
these observations. By requiring that the plaintiff produce addi-
tional evidence, such a standard essentially ignores the inference
of discrimination that arises when the plaintiff eliminates the most
common reasons for the adverse employment action17 and the
explanation given by the defendant. Given Justice Scalia's insis-
tence that the Hicks opinion was a further refinement of the
McDonnell Douglas line of cases rather than a departure from it,
the permissive inference understanding of the holding is the most
consistent interpretation.
4. Subsequent Judicial Interpretation
In the months of confusion following the Hicks decision, the
permissive inference reading gained favor as the correct interpreta-
tion, most notably in the Second,118  Fourth,
119  Fifth,120
116 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
117 As stated in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
the "most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plainitif's [adverse employment
action]" are eliminated by the four elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. at
253-54.
118 In DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993), the plaintiff,
a teacher at a Catholic school, claimed that he was dismissed because of his age. The
district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim because consideration of the case would result
in excessive entanglement in religion. Id. at 169. The Second Circuit reversed and con-
cluded that the issues arising under an age discrimination claim do not give rise to First
Amendment claims. Describing the issues presented under an age discrimination claim,
the Second Circuit interpreted the holding of Hicks to support a permissive inference
position:
The Supreme Court recently held . . . that the mere fact that a defendant prof-
fers a false reason for a challenged employment action does not necessarily es-
tablish liability. Proof that the employer has provided a false reason for its ac-
tion permits the finder of fact to determine that the defendant's actions were
motivated by an improper discriminatory intent, but does not compel such a
finding.
Id. at 170.
The Second Circuit also articulated this interpretation of Hicks in Saulpaugh v.
Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993) ("In some instances, as Justice
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Eighth,"' and Eleventh Circuits."' Recently, the permissive in-
ference position was expressly recognized by the Seventh Circuit in
Scalia notes, a plaintiff may meet this ultimate burden of proof by combining her proof
of the elements constituting a prima facie case with evidence that defendant's proffered
reasons for its acts were false."). Because the plaintiff had introduced substantial direct evi-
dence of retaliation, however, the decision did not rest upon the issue of pretext. Id. at
141, 142.
119 In United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit also
appeared to favor the permissive inference interpretation of Hicks. McMillon, an African
American, claimed that her drug conviction violated the Equal Protection clause because
the United States exercised a peremptory strike against an African American woman. In
discussing the defendant's burden of proving a discriminatory motive, the court referred
to the similar inquiry in the Title VII context:
As in Hicks, simply showing that the reasons advanced are pretextual does not
automatically compel a finding of intentional discrimination (although under the
proper facts such a showing can be sufficient). Instead, the inquiry always re-
mains the same: the challenging party (here, the defendant) must show, through
all relevant circumstances, that the prosecutor intentionally exercised his strike
because of racial concerns.
Id. at 952 n.3.
120 In Moham v. Steego Corp., 3 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit reviewed
a judgment for the plaintiff on his claim that the defendant denied him the opportunity
to seek employment because of his race. The defendant's witness testified that the plain-
tiff was not hired because he had not applied for the position. The court found the
testimony "unconvincing." Id. at 875. Based upon this finding of pretext, the district
court inferred the ultimate fact of racial discrimination, and the Fifth Circuit did not
challenge this conclusion. Id. at 876.
121 In Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., No. 92-1753 (8th Cir. March 2,
1994), the defendant argued that the evidence for the plaintiff's ADEA claim was insuffi-
cient and, therefore, improperly submitted to the jury. Id. at *2. The Eighth Circuit re-
fused to grant the defendant's motion because the plaintiff had met the evidentiary re-
quirements mandated by Hicks. The court outlined the minimum showing required by
the plaintiff and concluded that
if (1) the elements of a prima facie case are present, and (2) there exists suffi-
cient evidence for a reasonable jury to reject the defendant's proffered reasons
for its actions, then the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to determine
whether intentional discrimination has occurred, and we are without power to
reverse the jury's finding.
Id. at *10. As this indicates, the Eighth Circuit did not require additional evidence of dis-
crimination and, therefore, rejected a pretext plus interpretation of Hicks.
122 In Meeks v. Computer Associates International, No. 92-2926, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4073 (11th Cir. Mar. 7, 1994), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Hicks "modi-
fied slightly" the pretext only position which the Circuit had formerly followed. Id. at *19
n.1. Meeks accepted a permissive inference of Hicks, as it referred to the "suspicion of
mendacity" language and emphasized that "'no additional proof of discrimination is
required' to support a finding of intentional discrimination." Id. (citation omitted). The
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment for the plaintiff on her sex dis-
crimination claim. This was done, however, because the district court had failed to make
a finding of intentional discrimination, even though it may have properly inferred discrim-
ination. Id. at *23-*25.
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Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp."ss Arthur Anderson was dis-
charged from his position as unit manager for heating, ventilating,
and air conditioning at Baxter's facility in Deerfield, Illinois. He
claimed that his discharge was wrongfully motivated by his age, in
violation of the Age Discrimination in-Employment Act (ADEA).
In response to Anderson's claim, Baxter introduced evidence of
several incidents which occurred "as a direct result of Anderson's
inattentiveness to preventative maintenance and overall poor work
performance."" After discovery, Baxter moved for summary
judgment, and the district court granted the motion, agreeing that
Anderson had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
his age discrimination claim.
The Seventh Circuit panel of Judges Kanne, Easterbrook, and
Flaum agreed with the district court. Judge Kanne, writing for the
panel, directly addressed the confusion surrounding the holding of
Hicks. He asserted that three competing positions had developed
on the issue' of the plaintiff's burden: pretext only, pretext plus,
and what the Seventh Circuit termed the "modified pretext only"
position."s The modified pretext only position was adopted by
the Seventh Circuit prior to the Hicks decision in Visser v. Packer
Engineering Association, a 1991 en banc decision. 26 According to
Visser, "if the employer offers a pretext-a phony reason-for why
it fired the employee, then the trier of fact is permitted, although
not compelled, to infer that the real reason was age." 27
The Seventh Circuit held that Hicks clearly rejected the pre-
text only position, and, although less clear, the Supreme Court
adopted Virssers version of pretext only rather than the pretext
plus position.
In our view the holding in Hicks is that a plaintiff is not enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law simply because she proves
123 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
124 Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1121. Baxter claimed that Anderson was responsible for four
incidents: a fire valve was incorrectly left closed for months in violation of fire marshall
policy; fuses in the fire alarm system were improperly pulled, causing the alarm system to
fail; Anderson fWled to have tests performed on a high voltage switch gear in the main
electrical breaker to ensure that it was operating properly; and Anderson failed to check
the installation of an air handler motor. Id.
125 I refer to this position as the "permissive inference" position, a name used by the
EEOC in its preliminary guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. See Neely, supra
note 84, at 3.
126 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991).
127 Vrsser, 924 F.2d at 657 (citing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir.
1990)).
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her prima facie case and shows that the employer's proffered
reasons for her discharge are false. The next logical question is
whether the plaintiff may prevail, not automatically as a matter
of law, but through submission of her case to the ultimate
factfinder, under such circumstances. Hicks answers this ques-
tion in the affirmative."8
The court observed that language in the Hicks decision could
support a pretext plus reading, requiring additional evidence in
order to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof. "However," con-
cluded the court, "such language is dicta."" Even though the
plaintiff is not required to introduce additional evidence of dis-
criminatory intent, wrote the court, "the plaintiff might be well
advised" to do so.'
5. Interpretation by the EEOC
The EEOC has also supported a permissive inference reading
of Hicks. In his Preliminary Guidance on the decision, Deputy
General Counsel James R. Neely, Jr. wrote that "the finding of
pretext may, of itself, constitute a sufficient basis for the ultimate
finding of discrimination, but the factfinder must make an inde-
pendent finding of discrimination." 3" Neely supported this con-
clusion with Hicks's "suspicion of mendacity" language,S2 as well
as footnote four of Justice Scalia's opinion, which stated that
"[e]ven though .. .rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons
is enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination, there must be
a finding of discrimination."'33 While acknowledging that the opin-
ion presents language which could be read to support a pretext
plus interpretation, Neely concluded that Hicks rejects the pretext
plus position because it does not require additional evidence to
support a finding of discrimination."
V. APPLICATION OF HICKS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The holding of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks addressed the
burden of proof that the plaintiff must bear at trial. In the
128 Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123.
129 Id. at 1124 n.3.
130 Id. at 1124.
131 Neely, supra note 84, at 3.
132 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
133 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 n.4 (1993).
134 Neely, supra note 84, at 3.
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months following this decision, the federal courts have struggled
with an issue that Hicks did not directly address: what burden must
the plaintiff bear to survive the defendant's motion for summary
judgment? Two alternate standards have been articulated, both of
which root themselves in the language of St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks.
A. Majority Position: Genuine Issue of
Material Fact as to Pretext
Even though the holding of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
made it more difficult for many plaintiffs to prevail at trial, the
majority of circuits which have addressed the application of Hicks
to summary judgment have articulated a standard which is favor-
able to plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit's discussion and holding in
Washington v. Garret' 5 represents this position. The plaintiff, a
black woman, worked as a Public Affairs Specialist at the Naval
Training Center in San Diego, California. She claimed she was dis-
charged from her position because of her race and gender. After
an administrative review, the district court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment."3 6
In reversing the district court's judgment, Judge Betty Fletcher
of the Ninth Circuit wrote that the
burden on summary judgment... is thus to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination and, if the employer articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, to raise a
genuine factual issue as to whether the articulated reason was
pretextual. If a plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual
issue regarding the authenticity of the employer's stated motive,
summary judgment is inappropriate, because it is for the trier
of fact to decide which story is to be believed."7
The court referred to the language in Hicks which states that a
trier of fact may infer discrimination from a showing of a prima
facie case and pretext. It continued:
Because, as St. Mary's recognizes, the factfinder in a Title VII
case is entitled to infer discrimination from plaintiff's proof of
a prima facie case and showing of pretext without anything
more, there will always be a question for the factfinder once a
135 10 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1993) (as amended Jan. 26, 1994).
136 Id. at 1424-28.
137 Id. at 1433 (citations omitted).
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plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and raises a genuine
issue as to whether the employer's explanation for its action is
true. Such a question cannot be resolved on summary judg-
ment.s
This reasoning has also been stated by the Fourth,13 9  Sev-
enth,"4 Tenth,14 t and Eleventh' Circuits and is often based
138 Id.
139 The Fourth Circuit's holding in Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th
Cir. 1993), appears to have followed the majority rule. In examining the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court held that the plaintiff could be defeated by the
motion in two ways: by failing to establish a prima facie case or "by failing to show a
genuine factual dispute over the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation." Id.
at 1317. The plaintiff in this case, however, "failed to establish a prima facie case and
failed to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion . . . by establishing a genuine issue of
material fact in connection with the [defendant's] explanation." Therefore, summary
judgment was granted. Id. at 1318.
140 In Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994), the Sev-
enth Circuit reviewed the defendant's motion for summary judgment and wrote:
For summary judgment purposes, the non-moving party . . . has a lesser burden.
He must only "produce evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer
that the company lied" about its proffered reasons for his dismissal."
. . . If the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is a lie,
the inference that the real reason was a forbidden one, such as age, may ratio-
nally be drawn. This is the common sense behind McDonnell Douglas .... The
point is only that if the inference of improper motive can be drawn, there must
be a trial.
Id. at 1124 (quoting Shager v. Upjohn, Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990)) (citations
omitted). Despite this lower standard for summary judgment, the plaintiff's evidence of
pretext (including an affidavit from a former supervisor and the deposition of a former
co-worker) were conclusory and insufficient to create a material issue of fact. Id. at 1125.
The motion for summary judgment, therefore, was granted.
141 In Durham v. Xerox Corp., No. 92-6398, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3444 (10th Cir.
Feb. 24, 1994), the plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to promote her because of
her race. At trial, the defendant responded that the plaintiff was passed over for promo-
tion because she was less qualified than the other candidates. Id. at *3. The plaintiff had
introduced evidence that she was, in fact, more qualified than those who were promoted,
but the district judge did not take the evidence into account. Id. at *8. This evidence,
concluded the Tenth Circuit, was improperly ignored:
[P]roof that Durham was more qualified would disprove Xerox's only explana-
tion for its actions, that Durham was less qualified than the successful candi-
dates. Although a prima facie case combined with disproof of the employer's
explanations does not prove intentional discrimination as a matter of law, it may
permit the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination, and thus preclude sum-
mary judgment for the employer.
Id. at *8-*9. Even under this lower standard, however, the plaintiff's evidence only ad-
dressed whether the plaintiff was qualified for the position, not whether she was more
qualified. Id. at *9. As a result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the motion for summa-
ry judgment was properly granted. Id. at *13.
142 In Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing, 9 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 1993), the plain-
tiff alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for filing an age discrimination com-
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upon the "suspicion of mendacity" language found in Part II of
the Hicks decision. This standard focuses on the sufficiency of the
evidence regarding the issue of pretext: if the plaintiff succeeds in
raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext, he sur-
vives summary judgment.
B. Minority Position: Genuine Issue of Material Fact
as to Intentional Discrimination
A minority of courts, including the First and Fifth1" Cir-
cuits, have chosen a standard for deciding summary judgment
motions which makes it more difficult for the plaintiff to prevail
than under the majority position. According to these courts, in
order to prevail at the summary judgment stage, it is not enough
that the plaintiff introduce evidence that raises a genuine issue of
plaint with the EEOC, and the district court granted the defendant's motion for summa-
ry judgment. Id. at 915. The Eleventh Circuit noted the difficulty in ascertaining the true
motives of an employer and, therefore, the general unsuitability of resolving such issues
on summary judgment. Id. at 919, 921. The court then articulated its standard for sum-
mary judgment motions:
[The] plaintiffs burden at summary judgment is met by introducing evidence
that could form the basis for a finding of facts, which when taken in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, could allow a jury to find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the plaintiff has established pretext, and that the
action taken was in retaliation for engaging in the protected activity.
Id. at 921. Because the plaintiff "provided a sufficient factual basis in the record upon
which a reasonable trier of fact may find that the stated reasons for the adverse employ-
ment actions were mere pretext," the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for trial. Id.
143 The First Circuit, in LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (lst Cir.
1993), considered the evidence presented in support of the plaintiffs age discrimination
claim. Articulating its standard for summary judgment motions, the court wrote that it
"required not only 'minimally sufficient evidence of pretext,' but evidence that overall
reasonably supports a finding of discriminatory animus." Id. at 842-43 (quoting Goldman
v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993)). The First Circuit also
stated that "the plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment if the record is devoid of ade-
quate direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of the em-
ployer." Id. at 843. The plaintiffs evidence, taken as a whole, failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to age discrimination, and the district court's grant of summary
judgment was affirmed. Id. at 849.
144 In Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., 5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth
Circuit reviewed the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's age
discrimination claim. The court emphasized the Hicks requirement that the plaintiff prove
intentional discrimination and wrote that "because Bodenheimer would be required to
prove at trial, through a preponderance of the evidence, that PPG's proffered reasons
are a pretext for age discrimination, he must now produce sufficient evidence to establish
that PPG's reasons were pretexts for age discrimination." Id. at 958. Under this standard,
the court considered the plaintiff's evidence insufficient and upheld the district court's
dismissal. Id. at 959.
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material fact regarding pretext. Rather, because the plaintiff must
carry at trial the burden of proving discrimination, summary judg-
ment must be granted unless the plaintiff can introduce evidence
from which the ultimate finding of discrimination may be in-
ferred. Therefore, a plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient for
the factfinder to conclude reasonably that the employer's decision
was wrongfully based on a prohibited factor, such as age. Under
this approach, the court does not ignore evidence of pretext, but
it determines that the evidence as a whole would permit the trier
of fact to infer the ultimate burden of discriminatory animus. Yet
because evidence of pretext alone may be insufficient, this stan-
dard is more difficult for a plaintiff lacking additional evidence to
meet.
C. Support for the Majority Standard
1. Textual Support
Courts which support the minority standard most often justify
their position with a passage taken from Part II of Hicks, which
states that once the employer succeeds "in carrying its burden of
production, the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presump-
tions and burdens-is no longer relevant."'45 These courts reason
that once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory motive in response to the plaintiffs complaint, only
the ultimate issue remains: whether the employer was motivated by
discriminatory animus. Unless the available evidence creates a
factual dispute on this issue, summary judgment is appropriate.
This interpretation of the sentence taken from Hicks, however,
is not a proper understanding of the entire passage from which it
was taken. The entire passage reads:
If, on the other hand, the defendant has succeeded in carrying
its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work-with its presumptions and burdens-is no longer rele-
vant. To resurrect it later, after the trier of fact has determined
that what was "produced" to meet the burden of production is
not credible, flies in the face of our holding in Burdine that to
rebut the presumption "[t]he defendant need not persuade the
court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons."
The presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defen-
dant to come forward with some response, simply drops out of
145 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
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the picture. The defendant's "production" (whatever its persua-
sive effect) having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to
decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proven "that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him]" be-
cause of his race. The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put
forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompa-
nied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional dis-
crimination. '46
The point of this passage is not that the issue of pretext is no lon-
ger relevant, but that the mandatory presumption which arises out of
the prima facie case is no longer relevant once it is rebutted by
the employer's proffered reasons. Far from ignoring or dismissing
step three of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Court empha-
sizes the crucial role that proof of a prima facie case and pretext
may play in proving discrimination.'47 Although the plaintiff's ul-
timate burden is and always has been to prove discrimination, the
Hicks opinion allows the plaintiff to accomplish this through the
demonstration of pretext. Evidence of pretext, therefore, should
permit the plaintiff to defeat the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
2. Support from the Assumptions Underlying the McDonnell
Douglas Framework
The majority position, with its focus on the evidence of pre-
text, permits the plaintiff and the court to make use of the as-
sumptions underlying the McDonnell Douglas framework. Because
employers usually do not act arbitrarily and because it is more
likely than not that an employer who conceals its true reason
acted out of an impermissible motivation, a showing of pretext
can give rise to a finding of intentional discrimination. The minor-
146 Id. (citations omitted).
147 The emphasis the Hicks opinion places upon the probative force of the prima
facie case echoes the Court's prior holding in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981). The Burdine Court explained that
[iln saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that the
trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by the
plainitff to establish a prima facie case .... Indeed, there may be some cases
where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of
the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
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ity position, which can be implemented in a manner that requires
additional evidence from the plaintiff, essentially ignores the as-
sumptions upon which McDonnell Douglas was based. The minority
standard for summary judgment wrongly excludes these common-
sense considerations from the court's reasoning and, therefore,
denies the plaintiff its opportunity to prove discrimination as de-
scribed in Hicks.
3. Interpretation by the EEOC
Furthermore, the majority position is the one accepted by the
EEOC. In his preliminary guidance on Hicks, Deputy General
Counsel James R. Neely, Jr., reasoned that "[s]ince a finder of fact
may find discrimination based solely on pretext, evidence sufficient
to create an issue of fact on that issue is, necessarily, evidence
sufficient to create an issue of fact on the ultimate question of
discrimination .... ""' Neely emphasized Justice Scalia's foot-
note four, which specifically states that a finder of fact may ififer
discrimination solely from evidence of pretext.
In conclusion, summary judgment is inappropriate whenever
the plaintiff raises a factual dispute as to pretext because a finding
of pretext may sustain a finding of discrimination. Courts that
apply the minority standard wrongly interpret the holding of Hicks
and deny plaintiffs the opportunity for a factfinder to infer dis-
crimination from their evidence. The proper focus at summary
judgment, therefore, is on the evidence of pretext.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding of St. May's Honor Center v. Hicks must be under-
stood against the background of the assumptions which gave rise
to McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. Because it is reasonable to
assume that an employer's false explanation conceals a discrimina-
tory motive, McDonnell Douglas permits an inferential bridge to
connect a showing of pretext and a finding of discrimination. A
permissive inference understanding of Hicks does not alter this
reasoning and allows the factfinder to draw its own conclusion
from the evidence presented by the plaintiff. By adopting the
majority standard in evaluating summary judgment motions, courts
act in a manner consistent with the holding of Hicks and allow
148 Neely, supra note 84, at 5.
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plaintiffs the opportunity to convince a factfinder that discrimina-
tion is the proper inference to be drawn from their evidence.
Jody H. Odell
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